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Abstract   
 
The European Commission is currently working on a legislative draft to harmonise the 
corporate income tax provisions for multinational groups of companies throughout the 
European Union. For that purpose the European Commission has installed a working group 
with the mission to draft a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) applicable 
for multinational companies. As the EU member states are not willing to surrender their 
taxing power to the supranational level of the EU each group entity’s tax base would be 
determined by apportionment of the group’s overall taxable income according to a predefined 
micro-economic factor based formula whereas the group income will be calculated by 
consolidating earnings beforehand separately determined by each group entity (pre-
consolidation income). The situs state of the particular group entity would then apply its 
statutory corporate tax rate on the apportioned tax base. This paper evaluates the effects of 
this prospective apportionment procedure on any given corporate group entity and finds that 
the share of the group’s income allocated to a particular entity using the apportionment 
formula does regularly not equal the pre-consolidation income of the respective group entity. 
The reasons for this regular observable deviation can be found on the one hand in the 
concept of the apportionment formula and on the other hand in the specifics of the definitions 
of the apportionment factors.  
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1. Introduction  
In October 2001, the European Commission communicated its plans for the coming years for 
company taxation in the European Union (COM(2001) 582 of 23/10/2001) based on a 
detailed study (see press release IP/01/1468). The communication identified several steps 
which should be taken to remove individual tax obstacles to cross-border trade in the Internal 
Market. Among others the Commission concluded that in the longer term member states 
should agree to allow EU companies to use a single consolidated base for computing tax on 
their EU-wide profits.  
 
In 2004, the European Commission established a Working Group to examine from a 
technical perspective the definition of a common consolidated tax base for companies 
operating in the EU, to discuss the basic tax principles, the fundamental structural elements 
of a common consolidated tax base and other necessities such as a mechanism for 'sharing' 
a consolidated tax base between Member States. The so called Working Group Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (WG CCCTB) was thus instructed to develop and discuss 
recommendations and eventually draft a legislative proposal for an EU-wide corporate tax 
base by the end of 2008 that would entitle multi-national groups of companies to consolidate 
profits and losses and that would solve the problems companies and member states are 
facing due to transfer pricing. The Working Group has published on its website1 more than 60 
discussion papers on a variety of aspects and issues as yet. However the work on the 
legislative proposal seems to be somewhat on hold as Commissioner László Kovács publicly 
announced that he “would rather present a perfectly elaborated and well justified product at 
the appropriate time than present an incomplete one just to meet an artificial deadline” 
(Kovács, 2008).   
 
The basic outline of the proposed EU-wide cross-border corporate tax system will, according 
to the published discussion papers, contain of a three step determination of the taxable 
income of any given group member. At first each group entity separately calculates its 
income based on its financial accounting by adjusting the financial accounting income to the 
provisions of the CCCTB. This separately accounted preliminary taxable income of the group 
entity may then be corrected to eliminate the income derived from intra-group trade (“push-
down accounting”) to form a (semi-)separately accounted pre-consolidation income of every 
member of the CCCTB-group. These (semi-)separately accounted pre-consolidation profits 
or losses of every group entity will then be consolidated to form the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base of the group which will in a last step be allocated to the group entities 
using a predefined micro-economic factor based apportionment formula. As it is currently not 
                                                
1 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/index_en.htm. 
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proposed that the consolidated group is subject to a supranational corporate income tax 
levied by the EU every group entity will then be taxed separately by its situs state based on 
the apportioned income at the situs state’s statutory tax rate. 
 
While the proposed income determination aims at respecting the corporate group as one 
single economic unit the income allocation procedure and the taxation of the group income 
takes the corporate structure of the group in consideration and taxes the group income at the 
level of the group entities not at the level of the group. The impact of this taxation as one 
single economic unit on the corporate entities forming the corporate group remains currently 
widely disregarded. This paper analyses this impact on a given corporate entity against the 
background of the group companies’ separate legal entity. While the proposed income 
determination regards the corporate group as one economic unit for tax purposes the 
national legal systems of a number of EU member states e.g. of Austria or Germany do not 
disregard the separate legal entities of the group companies for company law purposes, 
bankruptcy law purposes and purposes of creditor protection. Therefore the paper analyses 
the proposed income determination and apportionment procedure and compares its outcome 
with the result of the beforehand calculated pre-consolidation income of any given group 
entity.   
This analysis is conducted at two levels. Firstly a rather basic equilibrium condition is used to 
analyse the allocation results of the Formulary Apportionment (FA) compared with the 
respective group entity’s pre-consolidation income. To effectively demonstrate and analyse 
the FA results and to contrast it with the pre-consolidation income it is assumed that no 
differences in the details of the definitions of the apportionment factors and the determination 
factors of the taxable income exist. It is further assumed that all intra-group trade in goods 
and services is cancelled out already at the level of the respective group-entity as it is 
regularly done in group financial accounting (“push-down-accounting”). This analysis of 
rather structural differences between the determination of the pre-consolidation income and 
the following consolidation and apportionment is then followed by an analysis of the WG 
CCCTB’s proposals for the definitions of the apportionment factors that could also cause 
differences between the pre-consolidation income and the apportioned taxable income. 
 
Section 1.1 of the paper gives a brief overview of related literature that has evaluated 
formulary apportionment systems and the CCCTB working papers. Section 1.2 displays the 
currently discussed CCCTB apportionment formula. Section 2 shows the allocation results 
using the apportionment formula and contrasts them with the beforehand (semi-)separately 
determined pre-consolidation income assuming that every income producing factor is 
represented in the apportionment procedure and that the definition of every apportionment 
5 
 
factor equals the definition of the respective income producing factor. In section 3 these two 
basic assumptions of section 2 are withdrawn as the actual proposed definitions of the 
apportionment factors are analysed. The paper concludes in section 4 with an interpretation 
and a summary of the results. 
       
1.1. Related Literature  
The scope of the discussion papers is wide and the discussed issues are numerous. From 
the beginning of the Working Group’s existence it has spent much of its time discussing 
every issue in a very detailed way. This includes various definitional aspects of the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base such as depreciation rates and the treatment of accruals 
and deferrals. Lang, Pistone, Schuch, and Staringer, 2008 give a comprehensive notion of 
issues that should be considered and that have already been discussed. Although many 
aspects have already been thoroughly debated some issues still remain widely undiscussed.  
Using Formulary Apportionment to allocate income to parts of a company is well known in 
some jurisdictions but it is currently not used to allocate group income to group entities 
located in different nation states. Hellerstein and McLure, 2004, Martens-Weiner, 2002 and 
Martens-Weiner, 2006 analyse the Canadian and the US experience of using FA to allocate 
corporate income to various permanent establishments and/or provinces or states 
respectively. They show that the interaction of different formulas or different factor weightings 
respectively leads to distortions of the allocation results and to over taxation or under 
taxation of the corporate income. McLure, 1980, Gordon and Wilson, 1986 and Anand and 
Sansing, 2000 each with different approaches and with respect to different apportionment 
factors show that formulary apportionment changes the corporate income tax into a tax of the 
income producing factors used for apportionment. Agúndez-Garcia, 2006 and Weninger, 
2009 evaluate different FA-systems and different apportionment factors showing that every 
apportionment formula (no matter if macro-economic or micro-economic factors are used or if 
the allocation uses a value added approach) would lead to discretionary distortions and the 
choice of an optimal apportionment system depends heavily on the basic priorities sought 
from its outcome.  
Oestreicher, 2000 discusses three different systems of determining corporate income: 
separate accounting, formulary apportionment and a process oriented system of income 
determination and finds that every system has its advantages and shortcomings and that 
there is no such thing as an optimal income determination system that fits each and every 
need. 
Shackelford and Slemrod, 1998 discuss the revenue effects of a unilateral introduction of FA 
at the federal level in the United States. They find that the tax liability of US multinational 
companies would increase. Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb, 2006 discuss the revenue effects 
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of introducing FA in the EU including a system of cross-border loss relief finding as expected 
a decrease in the tax revenues of the EU member states concerned. 
 
1.2. The CCCTB Apportionment Formula  
The WG CCCTB proposes in its Working Document “CCCTB: possible elements of the 
sharing mechanism” WG CCCTB, 2007a a predefined apportionment formula based on 
universally applied microeconomic factors. In addition an application of firm specific factors is 
also announced to be discussed for specific industries such as the banking sector. The 
formula will be used to apportion the consolidated income of the group to every group 
member and simultaneously to every EU member state in which a group entity is located. 
The proposed sharing mechanism “itself is not the purpose of the comprehensive tax reform, 
but a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the consolidation” WG CCCTB, 2007a. 
The sharing mechanism and the proposed apportionment formula is aimed at being “as 
simple as possible to apply” and “difficult to manipulate” by the taxpayers by shifting of the 
factors to artificially relocate (parts of) the consolidated tax base and subsequently to 
artificially shift taxable income to low tax states. Additionally the sharing mechanism aims “to 
distribute the tax base among the various entities concerned in a way that can be considered 
fair and equitable” and therefore the sharing mechanism aims “not to lead to undesirable 
effects in terms of tax competition” WG CCCTB, 2007a. The proposed apportionment 
formula is intended to achieve these aims by using three factors, Sales (S), Labour (L) and 
Assets (A). The factor Labour is divided into two part-factors: the labour costs Payroll (P) and 
the Number of Employees (NE). Hence the tax base of a particular group member (Π i) would 
be calculated as follows: 
 
ߎ௜ ൌ ቆ 1݉  
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅  
1
݊ כ ቆ
1
2
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൅
1
2
ܰܧ௜
ܰܧ௚௥௣ቇ ൅
1
݋
ܣ௜
ܣ௚௥௣ቇ כ ܥܥܥܶܤ 
 
with ଵ௠ ൅
ଵ
௡ ൅
ଵ
௢ ൌ 1 , but the exact relative weighting not yet determined.  
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2.  Analysis of the Sharing Mechanism 
 
2.1. The Model 
The adoption of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base and a sharing mechanism 
using a predefined microeconomic factor based formula would be a major change in 
corporate income taxation for every EU member state as well as for every group of 
companies and every particular corporate entity concerned. Formulary apportionment of 
corporate income for tax purposes between sovereign nation states is currently nowhere in 
place (Weninger, 2009). Currently each member state of the European Union uses Separate 
Accounting with a dealing at arm’s length approach to determine the taxable income of 
corporations trading with affiliated companies. However formula apportionment is used by a 
number of countries to allocate corporate income between provinces, states and 
municipalities or townships (Kobetzky, 2008; Martens-Weiner, 2005; Weninger, 2009). As the 
implementation of a consolidation with subsequent Formulary Apportionment is a 
fundamental change in corporate income taxation throughout Europe, this paper aims to 
evaluate the possible impacts of this change to the tax burden of any given group entity 
concerned but not of the group of companies as a whole. 
 
The question arises under which circumstances this allocated taxable income of a particular 
group entity (Π i) matches the pre-consolidation income of that particular group entity 
especially if the consolidation itself has no effect as income resulting from intra-group trade is 
already excluded at the level of the respective group entity (“push-down-accounting”) and as 
every group entity is profitable and thus no intra-group cross-border loss offset occurs as 
such a loss offset would overlap the effects of the formulary apportionment. Under such 
assumptions the pre-consolidation income of the group entity relative to the group income 
should equal the share of group income apportioned to the respective group entity after the 
consolidation of the taxable income.  Therefore an equilibrium condition could be stated as 
follows: 
 
 (1.1)  
ߎܴܲܧ݅
ߎ௚௥௣ ൌ
ߎܣܨܶܧܴ݅
ߎ௚௥௣  
 
 ߎ௉ோா௜   Pre-consolidation income of group entity i  
 ߎ஺ி்ாோ௜  Taxable income of group entity i after consolidation and apportionment 
 ߎ௚௥௣  Taxable consolidated group income  
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2.2. Hypothesis  
The two phases of the determination and allocation of the group’s income differ in the way 
the income producing factors (income determination factors) and income apportionment 
factors are combined. The economic combination of the income producing factors at the 
group entity is represented in the determination of the pre-consolidation income as revenues 
minus expenditures. The apportionment formula subsequently relates the income producing 
factors of the group entity to the income producing factors of the whole group. The allocation 
factors of the two phases of the income determination and allocation procedure are basically 
the same (ie Sales, Labour, Assets) but the way these allocation factors are assembled and 
used in the allocation process differs between the two phases. Thus the following hypothesis  
can be stated: 
 
(hyp 1)  The proportion of overall group income allocated to a particular group entity i  
(group-to-group-entity-ratioAFTER) by using Formulary Apportionment can only 
be equal to the proportion of overall group income calculated by a particular 
group entity i before the consolidation (group-to-group-entity-ratioPRE) if every 
used apportionment factor and income producing factor respectively is 
uniformly distributed between group entity i and the whole group.   
 
 
2.3. Evidence  
The hypothesis is tested with the two Apportionment Formulas serving as role models for the 
CCCTB-Formula, the Canadian Apportionment Formula and the US Massachusetts-Formula, 
starting with the Canadian Formula that contains of only two factors: Sales (S) and  
Payroll (P). 
 
 (2.1)  
ߎܣܨܶܧܴ݅ ൌ ቆ
1
2
ܵ݅
ܵ݃ݎ݌ ൅
1
2
ܲ݅
ܲ݃ݎ݌ቇ כ ߎ
௚௥௣ 
 
To control for bias caused by differences in income determination procedures it is assumed 
that the group entity also uses only the two factors sales and payroll to produce and 
determine its income: 
 
 (2.2)  
ߎܴܲܧ݅ ൌ  ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜ 
  
 (2.3)  
ߎ௚௥௣ ൌ  ܵ݃ݎ݌ െ ܲ݃ݎ݌ 
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Hypothesis (hyp 1) reads with respect to the Canadian Formula as follows: 
 
 (2.4)  
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൌ  
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ 
 
 
Entering equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) into the equilibrium condition (1.1) equals to: 
  
 (2.5)  
ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ ൌ
ሺ12 כ
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅
1
2 כ
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ሻ כ ሺܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ሻ
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣  
 
Equation (2.5) is solved as follows: 
 
2 כ ሺܵ௜ െ ܲ௜ሻ ൌ ቆ ܵ
௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ቇ כ ሺܵ
௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ሻ 
 
ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜ ൌ െ ܵ
௜ כ ܲ௚௥௣
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅
ܲ௜ כ ܵ௚௥௣
ܲ௚௥௣  
  
ܵ௜ ൅ ܲ௚௥௣ ܵ
௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൌ ܲ
௜ ൅ ܵ௚௥௣ ܲ
௜
ܲ௚௥௣ 
 
ܵ௜ כ ቆ1 ൅ ܲ
௚௥௣
ܵ௚௥௣ ቇ ൌ ܲ
௜ כ ቆ1 ൅ ܵ
௚௥௣
ܲ௚௥௣ቇ 
 
ܵ௜
ܲ௜ ൌ
൬1 ൅ ܵ
௚௥௣
ܲ௚௥௣൰
ቀ1 ൅ ܲ௚௥௣ܵ௚௥௣ ቁ
 
 
ܵ௜
ܲ௜ ൌ
ܵ௚௥௣
ܲ௚௥௣ כ
൬ܲ
௚௥௣
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅ 1൰
ቀ1 ൅ ܲ௚௥௣ܵ௚௥௣ ቁ
 
 
ܵ௜
ܲ௜ ൌ
ܵ௚௥௣
ܲ௚௥௣ 
 
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൌ
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ 
 
 
The proof shows that equation (2.5) which represents the equilibrium condition (1.1) for the 
Canadian Apportionment Formula can only be solved if ܵ
݅
ܵ݃ݎ݌ equals 
௉೔
௉೒ೝ೛. For the Canadian 
Apportionment Formula the equilibrium condition (1.1) can therefore be extended to: 
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 (2.6)   
ߎ௉ோா௜
ߎ௚௥௣ ൌ
ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ ൌ  
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൌ
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൌ  
ߎ஺ி்ாோ௜
ߎ௚௥௣  
 
 
The second role model for the CCCTB-Formula is one of the first apportionment formulas 
that had been developed: the so called Massachusetts-Formula. It is used by a number of 
US states and it also serves as a role model to the various other formulas currently used by 
US states. The main difference to the Canadian Formula is the use of three factors as Assets 
(A) represents the third apportionment factor: 
 
 (3.1)  
ߎ௜ ൌ ቆ13
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅
1
3
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൅
1
3
ܣ௜
ܣ௚௥௣ቇ כ ߎ
௚௥௣ 
 
Adding the factor Assets to the apportionment formula adds a further level of complexity to 
the analysis as the factor Assets influences the outcome of the income determination and 
allocation process in a twofold manner. On the one hand the factor Assets influences the 
income of the group as the cost of usage of the assets is deducted as amortization (amo). 
On the other hand the factor Assets influences the apportionment of the beforehand 
determined income as the book value of the assets at the balance sheet date is used to 
allocate the income to every group entity.  
 
For the analysis of the Massachusetts-Formula this twofold influence of the factor Assets has 
to be taken into account on the pre-consolidation side of the equation as well as on the 
Formulary Apportionment side. On both sides of equilibrium condition (1.1) the influence of 
cost of usage of assets has to be added (amo): 
 
 (3.2)   
 ܵ
௜ െ ܲ௜ െ  ࢇ࢓࢕࢏
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ  ࢇ࢓࢕ࢍ࢘࢖ ൌ
ሺ13 כ
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅
1
3 כ
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൅
1
3 כ
࡭࢏
࡭ࢍ࢘࢖ሻ כ ሺܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ  ࢇ࢓࢕ࢍ࢘࢖ሻ
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ ࢇ࢓࢕ࢍ࢘࢖  
or 
 (3.3)  
ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜ െ  ࢇ࢓࢕࢏
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ ࢇ࢓࢕ࢍ࢘࢖ ൌ  
1
3 כ
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅
1
3 כ
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൅
1
3 כ
࡭࢏
࡭ࢍ࢘࢖ 
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If the findings from (2.5) ( ܵ
݅
ܵ݃ݎ݌ = 
ܲ݅
ܲ݃ݎ݌ሻ are entered as a constant into (3.3) the equation finally 
simplifies to: 
ܽ݉݋௜
ܽ݉݋௚௥௣ ൌ
ܣ௜
ܣ௚௥௣ 
 
Equation (2.6) can therefore be extended to: 
 
 (3.4)  
ߎ௉ோா௜
ߎ௚௥௣ ൌ
ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜ െ ࢇ࢓࢕࢏
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ ࢇ࢓࢕ࢍ࢘࢖ ൌ  
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൌ
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൌ
࡭࢏
࡭ࢍ࢘࢖ ൌ  
ࢇ࢓࢕࢏
ࢇ࢓࢕ࢍ࢘࢖ ൌ
ߎ஺ி்ாோ௜
ߎ௚௥௣  
 
 
The CCCTB-Formula divides the factor Labour into two equally weighted part factors Payroll 
and Number of Employees (NE). The split of the labour factor actually introduces an 
additional apportionment factor. This fourth apportionment factor is solely an apportionment 
factor and has no direct influence on the determination of income as the working papers of 
the WG CCCTB do not provide for specific provisions linking the deductibility of personnel 
costs to the numbers of employees producing these costs. Entering the CCCTB-Formula into 
the equilibrium condition (1.1) results into: 
 
 (3.5)   
ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜ െ  ܽ݉݋௜
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ  ܽ݉݋௚௥௣ ൌ
ሺ 1݉
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅
1
݊ ൬
1
2
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൅
1
2
ࡺࡱ࢏
ࡺࡱࢍ࢘࢖൰ ൅  
1
݋
ܣ௜
ܣ௚௥௣ሻ כ ሺܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ  ܽ݉݋௚௥௣ሻ
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ ܽ݉݋௚௥௣  
 
or 
 
 (3.6)  
ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜ െ  ܽ݉݋௜
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ  ܽ݉݋௚௥௣ ൌ  
1
݉ כ
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൅
1
݊ ሺ
1
2
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൅
1
2
ࡺࡱ࢏
ࡺࡱࢍ࢘࢖ሻ ൅
1
݋ כ
ܣ௜
ܣ௚௥௣ 
 
Following the approach used to analyse the Canadian Formula and the Massachusetts 
Formula the equilibrium condition (1.1) could only hold true if the group-to-group-entity ratio 
of the factor Numbers of Employees also equals the group-to-group-entity ratio of every other 
apportionment factor: 
 
 (3.7)  
ߎ௉ோா௜
ߎ௚௥௣ ൌ
ܵ௜ െ ܲ௜ െ ܽ݉݋௜
ܵ௚௥௣ െ ܲ௚௥௣ െ ܽ݉݋௚௥௣ ൌ  
ܵ௜
ܵ௚௥௣ ൌ
ܲ௜
ܲ௚௥௣ ൌ  
ࡺࡱ࢏
ࡺࡱࢍ࢘࢖ ൌ
ܣ௜
ܣ௚௥௣ ൌ  
ܽ݉݋௜
ܽ݉݋௚௥௣ ൌ
ߎ஺ி்ாோ௜
ߎ௚௥௣  
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2.4. Simulation and Testing 
To test the outcome of section 2.3 a number of simulations is conducted using the analysed 
apportionment formulas and comparing the resulting allocation to fictitiously calculated pre-
consolidation earnings of the respective group entity using the same income factors and 
allocation factors. 
 
2.4.1. The Canadian Formula  
The Canadian Apportionment Formula uses only two factors and actually does not allocate 
income of a group of companies to the various group members but allocates corporate 
income to every Canadian province the company has a permanent establishment (PE) in. To 
simulate the effect of the Canadian Formula a company is assumed that has a PE in 
province A and a PE in province B. The company provides services without the use of any 
assets therefore its income factors contain only of Sales and Payroll.  
  
Factor Province A Province B Company 
Sales 9.000 4.000 13.000 
Payroll 6.000 3.000 9.000 
Pre-consolidation income 3.000 1.000  
Consolidated income 4.000 
 
If the Canadian Formula is used the company’s income is allocated to the two provinces 
involved as follows: 
 
Province A:   ቀଵଶ כ  
ଽ.଴଴଴
ଵଷ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଶ כ
଺.଴଴଴
ଽ.଴଴଴ቁ כ 4.000 ൎ ૛. ૠ૚ૡ 
 
Province B:   ቀଵଶ כ  
ସ.଴଴଴
ଵଷ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଶ כ
ଷ.଴଴଴
ଽ.଴଴଴ቁ כ 4.000 ൎ ૚. ૛ૡ૛ 
 
The randomly chosen amounts of the income factors and apportionment factors show that 
the pre-consolidation income regularly does not equal the Formulary Apportionment results. 
Province B benefits from the Formulary Apportionment as more income is allocated to the 
permanent establishment located there as in the pre-consolidation situation while province A 
gets a smaller share of the company’s income than in the pre-consolidation situation and 
therefore suffers a relative loss in tax revenues.  
Transposing this result to the procedure of the CCCTB which does not aim to allocate 
corporate income to various permanent establishments of one corporation but to allocate 
corporate group income to various group entities leads to the finding that a corporation A 
would benefit from the apportionment as a part of its pre-consolidation income is allocated to 
a corporation B which would then be made liable for this additional tax payment.  
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If the income factors of the PE in both provinces are not randomly chosen but are modelled 
to be uniformly distributed and therefore satisfy the findings of section 2.3 of this paper no 
income shifting between the provinces or the entities can be observed: 
     
Factor Province A Province B Company 
Sales 9.750 3.250 13.000 
Payroll 6.750 2.250 9.000 
Pre-consolidation income 3.000 1.000  
Consolidated Income 4.000 
 
If the Canadian Formula is used the company’s income is allocated to the two provinces as 
follows: 
 
Province A:   ቀଵଶ כ  
ଽ.଻ହ଴
ଵଷ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଶ כ
଺.଻ହ଴
ଽ.଴଴଴ቁ כ 4.000 ൌ ૜. ૙૙૙ 
 
Province B:   ቀଵଶ כ  
ଷ.ଶହ଴
ଵଷ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଶ כ
ଶ.ଶହ଴
ଽ.଴଴଴ቁ כ 4.000 ൌ ૚. ૙૙૙ 
 
2.4.2. The Massachusetts-Formula  
The US states use a variety of formulas that are all based on the Massachusetts-Formula 
and differ primarily in the weighting of the respective factors. However the most widely used 
formulas are the Massachusetts-Formula that weights every factor equally and the so called 
Double-Weighted Sales Formula that doubles the weight of the factor Sales relatively to the 
other two factors. The US Formulary Apportionment is similarly to the Canadian Formulary 
Apportionment used to allocate taxable income for state corporate income tax purposes to 
PE in different US states.  
 
The Massachusetts-Formula uses three factors (Sales, Payroll and Assets) to allocate the 
income. To simulate the effect of the Massachusetts-Formula a company is assumed that 
has a PE in state A and another permanent establishment in state B. The company’s income 
producing factors are only Sales, Payroll and Assets. Average amortization rates of 10% at 
the PE in state A and of 15% at the PE in state B are further assumed: 
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Factor State A State B Company 
Sales 9.000 4.000 13.000 
Payroll  6.000 3.000 9.000 
Assets 8.000 2.000 10.000 
Amortization 10% / 15% 800 300 1.100 
Pre-consolidation income  2.200 700
Consolidated Income 2.900 
 
The Massachusetts-Formula allocates the company’s income as follows: 
 
State A: ቀଵଷ כ
ଽ.଴଴଴
ଵଷ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଷ כ
଺.଴଴଴
ଽ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଷ כ
଼.଴଴଴
ଵ଴.଴଴଴ቁ כ 2.900 ൎ ૛. ૙ૡૠ 
 
State B: ቀଵଷ כ
ସ.଴଴଴
ଵଷ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଷ כ
ଷ.଴଴଴
ଽ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଷ כ
ଶ.଴଴଴
ଵ଴.଴଴଴ቁ כ 2.900 ൎ ૡ૚૜ 
 
Again the randomly chosen amounts for income factors and apportionment factors show as 
expected that the Formulary Apportionment regularly does not allocate a share of the 
company’s consolidated income that equals the respective PE’s pre-consolidation share of 
the company’s income. State B benefits from the Formulary Apportionment as a greater 
share of the company’s income than the pre-consolidation income of the PE is allocated to 
the PE located there while state A gets a smaller share of the company’s income than the 
pre-consolidation income of the PE and therefore suffers a relative loss in tax revenues.  
 
 
To test the findings of section 2.3 of the paper with the Massachusetts-Formula all income 
producing factors and allocation factors are modeled to be uniformly distributed: 
  
Factor State A State B Company 
Sales 9.862 3.138 13.000 
Payroll  6.828 2.172 9.000 
Assets 7.586 2.414 10.000 
Amortization 11% 834 266 1.100 
Pre-consolidation income 2.200 700
Consolidated income 2.900 
  
 The Massachusetts-Formula allocates the company’s income as follows: 
 
State A: ቀଵଷ כ
ଽ.଼଺ଶ
ଵଷ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଷ כ
଺.଼ଶ଼
ଽ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଷ כ
଻.ହ଼଺
ଵ଴.଴଴଴ቁ כ 2.900 ൌ ૛. ૛૙૙ 
 
State B: ቀଵଷ כ
ଷ.ଵଶ଼
ଵଷ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଷ כ
ଶ.ଵ଻ଶ
ଽ.଴଴଴ ൅
ଵ
ଷ כ
ଶ.ସଵସ
ଵ଴.଴଴଴ቁ כ 2.900 ൌ ૠ૙૙ 
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2.4.3. Other Formulas used by US states 
The US states use a variety of different formulas that are all based on the Massachusetts-
Formula and differ primarily in the relative weight of each apportionment factor. For example 
23 states use the Double-Weighted Sales Formula some states use solely the factor Sales 
(e.g. Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska); some states weight the factor Sales at 60% (Ohio), at 75% 
(Minnesota), at 80% (Oregon) or at 90% (Michigan); the other two factors are usually 
weighted relatively equal to each other. As these other US formulas differ only in the relative 
factor weights the findings of section 2.3 are also observable for these formulas: 
 
 Randomly chosen S, P, A  uniformly distributed 
S,P, A, amo  
uniformly distributed
Formula A B A B A B 
Massachusetts-Formula  
(33,3% S; 33,3% P; 33,3% A) 2.087,01 812,99 2.184,30 695,01 2.200,00 700,00 
Double-weighted sales Formula 
(50% S; 25% P; 25% A) 2.067,18 832,82 2.184,30 695,01 2.200,00 700,00 
Ohio-Pennsylvania-Rhode Island  
(60% S; 20% P; 20% A) 2.055,28 844,72 2.184,30 695,01 2.200,00 700,00 
Minnesota  
(75% S; 12,5% P; 12,5% A) 2.037,44 862,56 2.184,30 695,01 2.200,00 700,00 
Oregon  
(80% S; 10% P; 10% A) 2.031,49 868,51 2.184,30 695,01 2.200,00 700,00 
Michigan  
(90% S; 5% P; 5% A) 2.019,59 880,41 2.184,30 695,01 2.200,00 700,00 
Illinois-Iowa-Nebraska  
(100% sales) 2.007,69 892,31 2.184,30 695,01 2.200,00 700,00 
Pre-consolidation Income  2.200,00 700,00 2.275,86 603,45 2.200,00 700,00 
 
The mathematical evidence in section 2.3 of this paper and the simulation in section 2.4 of 
this paper show that the figures calculated for pre-consolidation income and for after-
apportionment income will only be identical if the income determination factors used by the 
apportionment formula are uniformly distributed. As the characteristics of those 
apportionment factors are highly diverse and a uniform distribution is thus not to be expected 
the two phases of the income determination and allocation process will regularly produce 
different results. Both results seem to be justifiable as both regard the corporate group as 
one single economic unit: The calculation of the pre-consolidation income in this paper by 
definition disregards all profit or losses from intra-group trade as well as the apportioned 
income that is based on the pre-consolidation income of every group entity.     
 
  
16 
 
3. Analysis of the Apportionment Factors 
The WP CCCTB proposes an apportionment formula using 3 apportionment factors (Sales, 
Labour and Assets) whereas the factor Labour is split into two relatively to each other equally 
weighted part-factors Payroll and Number of Employees. The aim of these two + two 
apportionment factors is to represent all phases of the profit-making process of the group of 
companies. The factor Sales therefore represents the demand side of this process while the 
factors Labour and Assets represent the supply side of this process. These two phases are 
also represented in the pre-consolidation income determination of every group entity in the 
form of revenues and expenditures of the respective group entity.  
After section 2 of this paper showed regularly observable differences between formulary 
apportionment results and the pre-consolidation income that are effected by rather structural 
and conceptual differences of these two phases of the income determination and allocation 
procedure section 3 of the paper analyses differences in the definitions of the proposed 
apportionment factors compared to the respective income producing factors and show their 
effects on the outcome of the apportionment procedure compared to the group entity’s pre-
consolidation income. 
 
3.1. Sales 
The factor Sales represents on the one hand the marketing phase of the profit making 
process and on the other hand basically the income determination factor revenues. As all 
profits or losses of the group entities are consolidated and therefore the income from intra-
group trade in goods and services are excluded from the apportionment factor Sales will only 
contain sales from trade in goods and services to buyers not part of the consolidated group 
(external sales). But not all proceeds of sales of goods and services to third-party buyers will 
be included in the apportionment factors Sales. The WP CCCTB suggests that extraordinary 
income should be excluded from the factor as well as revenues from passive income such as 
interests, dividends, deemed dividends and royalties should be excluded unless these 
revenues are accrued in the ordinary course of business of the respective group entity. The 
WP CCCTB further stresses out that these exclusions should only affect the apportionment 
factor and not the tax base with the effect that this extraordinary and passive income will be 
taxable (WP CCCTB, 2007a, point 50). 
The location of the factor Sales is suggested as sales by destination. One rationale of this 
concept is that the destination of goods or services esp the place of consummation of the 
goods by the customer can hardly be influenced by the seller company. The selling company 
may try to relocate the destination by selling to a third party intermediary which would reduce 
the profit margin compared to a direct business. Therefore the factor sales by destination is 
more expensively to manipulate than the factor sales by origin which could easily be 
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manipulated by the group of companies by establishing warehouse companies in favourable 
(low tax) countries. A second rationale of this concept is that the marketing-state which 
enables supply and demand to come together is provided with tax revenues in exchange for 
the cost of providing markets and infrastructure to the seller and the buyer (Oestreicher, 
2000, p 155). Assuming that the sales will regularly exceed the costs of production 
(represented by the factors Labour and Assets) the destination-based sales-factor will 
regularly apportion a greater share of the taxable income to the marketing-state than to the 
production-state.  
The concept of sales by destination causes the need to determine that very destination. A 
pure concept of sales by destination would lead to an allocation of a share of the group’s 
taxable income to any member state in which the group has sold one product or in which the 
group has provided one service. This would without much doubt lead to an increase in the 
group’s compliance costs and in certain situations to an increase in the group’s overall tax 
burden. Therefore the WP CCCTB suggests allocating taxable income to any given member 
state only if the group of companies has a qualitative economic relation (Nexus) to that 
member state. To establish Nexus it is necessary according to the WP CCCTB to have a 
physical presence (WP CCCTB, 2007a, point 61) in that very state which means that the 
traditional concept of permanent establishment and its shortcomings is prolonged by the 
CCCTB and the concept of sales by destination is only implemented to a certain degree. 
Sales to a buyer located in a state where Nexus is not established will be allocated to all 
group entities according to the so called spread throw-back rule (WP CCCTB, 2007a, point 
58) which implicitly gives the other two apportionment factors a higher weighting. 
The WP CCCTB aims at making the apportionment factor Sales as little manipulable as 
possible. This aim is pursued by excluding proceeds from passive income whose underlying 
assets could easily be transferred to other group entities and this aim is pursued by 
proposing the sales by destination concept. However the proposed Nexus-requirements still 
allow the group of companies to manipulate its overall tax liability by choosing to establish 
Nexus or not. Not-establishing Nexus in a high tax country will lead to an apportionment of all 
proceeds from this country to the whole group and to a taxation of those proceeds at the 
effective (average) group tax rate.        
 
3.2. Labour  
The factor Labour representing inter alia the supply side of the profit making process is 
suggested to be split into two part-factors Payroll and Number of Employees. The split is 
justified by the WP CCCTB with the different wage levels throughout the European Union 
especially between the western European member states (EU-15) and the central and 
eastern European member states (EU-12) (WP CCCTB, 2007c, point 16). The higher wage 
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levels and higher ancillary labour costs in the EU-15 would apportion a greater part of the 
group’s tax base to the EU-15 which may not always correspond with the value created in 
these member states. Thus it is seen necessary to relativise the Payroll costs by the Number 
of Employees producing these costs.  
3.2.1. Payroll  
The factor Payroll is relatively straightforward defined as it is suggested that the 
apportionment factor Payroll should be equal to the remuneration that is taken into account 
as a deductible expense for the purpose of calculating the tax base, including fringe benefits, 
social contributions, etc (WP CCCTB, 2007a, point 25), which should make the calculation of 
the apportionment factor Payroll relatively easy. However regarding the definition of the 
factor Payroll two issues arise: The location of the factor Payroll and the definition of 
‘employee’ are critical. Usually the employee will render services at the same place where 
the group entity that registered this employee on its payroll is located. So therefore the 
corporation paying the wage will also be the corporation that benefits from the work of the 
employee and therefore it is reasonable to allocate taxable income to that corporation. 
However it is possible that a corporation has an employee on its payroll but the employee 
provides services to a different group entity. The group could for example use a special 
purpose corporation in a low tax country that registers all employees of the group on its 
payroll to artificially shift portions of the tax base to this low tax country by shifting the 
Payroll-factor to this low tax country. To hinder such artificial factor shifting it is suggested 
that the factor Payroll contains only the wages paid to employees that actually perform 
services for or to the respective group entity regardless which group entity actually registered 
the employee on its payroll. 
The second issue is the definition of ‘employee’. The WP CCCTB does not provide one 
harmonised definition of employee but instead proposes that the definition of employee 
should be based on the domestic legislation of the member state in which the employee 
performs its services (WP CCCTB, 2007a, point 22). The WP CCCTB further suggests a 
system of mutual recognition of the various employee definitions by the other member states 
involved. The definition of a ’typical’ employee will regularly not differ heavily from one 
member state to the other but on the edges of this definition where directors or (in)dependent 
contractors are concerned these definitions may vary from member state to member state. In 
the U.S. on the contrary the harmonised definition of employee for tax purposes is seen as a 
major advantage (Hellerstein and McLure, 2004). 
3.2.2. Number of Employees  
With the part-factor Number of Employees the WP CCCTB proposes an apportionment factor 
that has no direct influence in the calculation of the pre-consolidation income of the group 
entity or the consolidated group income nor is it part of any apportionment formulas currently 
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employed worldwide. The implementation of this part-factor Number of Employees seems at 
a first glance reasonable and justifiable as it should help to even the influences of the 
different wage levels in the various member states on the apportionment results. By drawing 
this direct relation between Payroll and Number of Employees it is assumed that a high 
amount of payroll combined with a relatively small number of employees shows a lower 
degree of productivity whereas a small amount of payroll combined with a relatively high 
number of employees shows a higher degree of productivity. The lower degree of 
productivity therefore justifies allocating a smaller amount of tax base to the situs state 
whereas as a higher degree of productivity justifies the opposite. But a higher amount of 
Payroll combined with a small Number of Employees could also mean that the services the 
employees perform demand a higher degree of education and knowledge and therefore 
higher wages are justifiable. Therefore the part-factor Number of Employees seems to result 
in reasonable allocations only if any unit of labour has the same effect on the value of the 
corporate group what may not always be the case. However the mere existence of the part-
factor Number of Employees will lead to a taxable income apportioned differntly than the pre-
consolidation income of the group entity as the part-factor NE is not directly represented in 
the income calculation process (Agúndez-Garcia, 2006). 
 
3.3. Assets  
The WP CCCTB proposes that for practicability, simplicity and manipulability reasons only 
fixed tangible assets (Property, Plant and Equipment – PPE) should be taken into account for 
calculating the apportionment factor Assets (WP CCCTB, 2007a, point 30). Financial assets 
and current assets are excluded because of their mobility which could easily be used by the 
group to manipulate its tax liability by factor shifting. The exclusion of intangible assets 
(patents, trademarks, etc) is primarily justified by the difficult valuation of intangible assets 
especially of self-generated intangible assets. This argumentation does only hold true with 
respect to self-generated intangible assets while acquired intangible assets can easily be 
valued with their historical cost or their historical cost less amortisation (book value) as it is 
proposed for PPE. Additionally the WP CCCTB mentions that self-generated intangible 
assets are already included indirectly in the apportionment formula by the other factors (WP 
CCCTB, 2007a, point 34); in the factors Payroll and Number of Employees through the 
employees (researchers and developers) producing the intangible assets and in the factor 
Sales through the goods sold that were produced with the intangible assets. This argument is 
basically correct but it is not an argument for the exclusion of intangible assets exclusively as 
also self-generated fixed tangible assets and self-generated current assets are represented 
in the apportionment formula by the other two factors. Based on this argument it would be 
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justifiable to exclude all self-generated assets regardless whether they are fixed or current, 
tangible or intangible and not only self-generated intangible fixed assets. 
Apart from the question which categories of assets may be included the WP CCCTB 
suggests as regards to valuation using the “tax written down value” (historical cost less 
amortisation) of the assets (WP CCCTB, 2007a, point 36) at the balance sheet date. 
However to hinder arbitrary factor shifting shortly before the balance sheet date the WP 
CCCTB also discusses to use an average of the tax written down value at the actual balance 
sheet date and the previous balance sheet date.  
The respective asset is suggested to be located for purposes of the apportionment factor not 
at the legal owner but at the group entity which effectively uses the asset. Intra-group 
rented/leased assets will therefore be located at the lessee. For rented or leased assets from 
a lessor or to a lessee outside the group it is suggested to include the asset in both the 
lessor’s and the lessee’s apportionment factor as both use the asset to generate taxable 
income. At the level of the lessor it should be included with the tax written down value. And at 
the level of the lessee the asset is suggested to be included at eight times the annual lease. 
Using eight times the annual lease as a value for leased assets is justified by the WP 
CCCTB by the current practise in the U.S. This seems rather unsubstantiated especially as 
this method is highly criticised in U.S. tax literature (McLure 2002; Hellerstein and McLure, 
2004). 
As intra-group transfers of assets will be consolidated transferring written-down assets into 
low tax countries prior to the disposal of the assets can be used to shift the Asset-factor and 
with it the taxation of the capital gains into that country. To hinder such arbitrary factor-
shifting it is suggested to either include the asset sold in the factor of the group-entity that 
has used it primarily over the asset’s useful life or to impose a holding-period of one year 
before the asset is included at the apportionment factor assets of the selling group entity (WP 
CCCTB, 2007a, point 41).           
 
3.4. Concluding Remarks  
The proposed definitions of the two plus two factors are obviously influenced by the WP 
CCCTB’s aim of making the result of the apportionment as little manipulable as possible by 
the corporate group. Therefore it is seen necessary to exclude certain components of the 
underlying income producing factors in defining the respective apportionment factor. The 
apportionment factor Sales contains only of ordinary sales and active sales. However the 
taxable income contains also of sales derived from extraordinary business and also of 
passive income. Therefore the group entity earning the passive or extraordinary income and 
benefitting from its positive cash flow is not taxed with the full amount of this passive or 
extraordinary income but the passive or extraordinary income is allocated for tax purposes to 
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every group entity. With the passive income closely connected are the assets generating 
these revenues; basically financial assets and fixed intangible assets. These components of 
an Assets factor in its broader sense are also excluded from the apportionment factor Assets 
for anti-manipulation reasons. Therefore the income producing financial assets and/or 
intangible assets will not be included in the apportionment factor Assets of the group entity 
owning the financial assets and/or intangible assets that also earns the passive income and 
benefits from the positive cash flow. Not only that the passive income is not part of the 
apportionment factor Sales the assets producing the passive income are also not part of the 
apportionment factor Assets. A group entity that has passive income from financial assets or 
intangible assets will only be taxable with this income in the relation of its Payroll and 
Number of Employees relative to the corporate group’s Payroll and Number of Employees. 
Other income producing factors used to determine a group entity’s pre-consolidation income 
and the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base of the group such as depreciation, 
consumption of raw materials or consumption of inventory and stock are also excluded from 
the apportionment formula.  
 
As the apportionment formula does on the one hand not include every income producing 
factor but only represents some components of the income producing process and on the 
other hand includes a figure that is not directly represented in the income determination of 
the group and the respective group entity the apportionment formula may lead to 
apportionment results that do not equal the respective group entity’s pre-consolidation 
income. The exclusion of certain components of the factor Sales as well as of the factor 
Assets leads to an allocation of the taxable income derived from those sales and produced 
with those assets to all members of the corporate group regardless whether the actual cash-
flow from this revenues is allocated to the whole group or not. Thus one group entity 
probably pays taxes for income it did not realise while another group entity realizes income 
without being taxed.         
     
3.5. Simulation  
The income calculation proposed by the WP CCCTB is based upon the pre-consolidation 
income of each member of the corporate group. At first each group entity separately 
calculates its income based on its financial accounting by adjusting the financial accounting 
income to the provisions of the CCCTB. This preliminary taxable income of the group entity 
may then be corrected to eliminate the income derived from intra-group trade (“push-down 
accounting”) to form a (semi-)separately accounted pre-consolidation income of every 
member of the CCCTB-group. These (semi-)separately accounted pre-consolidation profits 
or losses of every group entity will then be consolidated to form the Common Consolidated 
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Corporate Tax Base of the group which will in a last step be allocated to the group entities 
using the apportionment formula.           
To demonstrate the differences between the pre-consolidation income of a given group entity 
and the allocated share of the group’s tax base resulting from the formulary apportionment a 
brief simulation using a corporate group established by two corporations is conducted. It is 
assumed that all revenues and expenditures from intra-group trade in goods and services 
have already been considered and eliminated at the level of each group entity. Thus only 
revenues and expenditures from trade with external partners remain. It is further assumed 
that both the parent and the subsidiary produce a positive pre-consolidation income so that 
the results are not influenced by an intra-group loss offset: 
 
Income Producing Factors  
 Parent Subsidiary Group 
Assets    
Fixed tangible (useful life: 20 Y) 2.000 2.000 4.000 
Fixed intagible (useful life: 25 Y) 3.500 0 3.500 
Financial Assets 450 0 450 
Sales    
Sales (active) 300 600 900 
Sales (passiv) 300 0 300 
Labour    
Payroll  100 200 300 
Number of Employees 5 12 17 
Miscellaneous     
Leasing Cost 0 8 8 
Consumption of comodity 100 200 300 
 
These income producing factors are used to calculate the following pre-consolidation 
earnings of the two group entities:  
 
 
Pre-consolidation income 
 Parent Subsidiary Group 
Revenues    
Sales (active) 300 600 900 
Sales (passiv) 300 0 300 
∑ Revenues 600 600 1.200 
Expenditures   
Amortisation (fixed tangible) 100 100 200 
Amortisation (fixed intangible) 140 0 140 
Amortisation (Financial) 0 0 0 
Leasing Cost 0 8 8 
Consumption of comodity 100 200 300 
Payroll  100 200 300 
∑ Expenditures 440 508 948 
pre-consolidation income (absolute) 160 92 252 
pre-consolidation income (in %) 63,49% 36,51% 100% 
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These pre-consolidation earnings are then consolidated to form the CCCTB (also presented 
in the table) which is then apportioned by using the proposed components of the income 
producing factors:     
 
Formulary Apportionment 
 Parent Subsidiary Group 
Apportionment Factors    
Sales    
Sales (active) 300 600 900 
Labour  
Payroll 100 200 300 
Number of Employees 5 12 17 
Assets  
Fixed tangible assets2  1.900 1.900 3.800 
Leasing (8 x annual lease) 0 64 64 
Apportionment Relation3 37,96% 62,04% 100% 
Tax Base (absolute) 95,66 156,34 252 
 
 
If these income factors are used to allocate the group income by using the proposed 
apportionment procedure and apportionment factors the group income will be allocated as 
expected to each group entity in a different relation. As the proposed apportionment factors 
exclude certain types of income producing factors the income derived from these factors is 
taxable according to the relations of the other factors and is thus allocated for tax purposes 
to every group member. In the example a smaller share of the group income than the pre-
consolidation income is apportioned to the parent company for tax purposes while the 
subsidiary’s taxable share of the group income is higher than its pre-consolidation income.    
 
 
4. Summary and Discussion  
The findings in section 2 of this paper show that under the assumption that every 
apportionment factor and the respective income producing factor are identically defined the 
pre-consolidation income of any given member of the corporate group will only under very 
specific circumstances equal the results of the Formulary Apportionment of the consolidated 
group income. The Apportionment Formula can only allocate a share of the consolidated 
group income to the group entity that equals the group entity’s pre-consolidation income if all 
used apportionment factors are uniformly distributed between the group entity and the 
corporate group. Such a uniform distribution of income factors that are used as allocation 
factors will probably not be observable in reality. The reasons for these different results can 
                                                
2 The fixed assets are valued at the book value at the balance sheet date. 
3 The apportionment factors are weighted relatively equal with 1/3 each. 
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be found in the specifics of the apportionment procedure: The Apportionment Formula uses a 
different arithmetical combination of the apportionment factors than the calculation of the pre-
consolidation income. This different arithmetical combination takes place regardless of the 
outcome of the economic combination of the related income producing factors by the 
respective group entity.   
 
While section 2 of the paper assumes that the income producing factors and the income 
allocation factors are identically defined, section 3 of the paper takes the actual definitions 
proposed by the WP CCCTB in consideration. In an attempt of making the income allocation 
as little exposed to artificial manipulations by the corporate group as possible certain 
components of the income producing factors are not represented in the definitions of the 
related apportionment factors. This incompleteness of the apportionment factors leads to an 
allocation of the income derived from the excluded components according to the included 
components of the income producing factor. The group entities concerned will regularly get a 
share of the group’s consolidated tax base allocated that does not equal the pre-
consolidation income it has calculated (semi-)separately before. The amount of this allocated 
share of the group’s tax base can regardless of the group entity’s profitability be higher or 
lower than the entity’s pre-consolidation income which could lead to an over or an under 
taxation of that particular group entity. The Apportionment Formula will thus also allocate a 
share of the taxable group income to the group entity even if the (semi-)separately calculated 
pre-consolidation income is negative which may cause a substantial decrease in liquidity of 
the group entity. Considering the matter of fact that each group entity will remain its separate 
legal entity with all the associated legal rights and duties Formulary Apportionment potentially 
leads without the existence of an intra-group compensation system to unremunerated 
transfers of liquidity and assets from one group entity to another. However for the WG 
CCCTB there seems to be no need for an intra-group compensation system “as a group 
member receives a share in all the profits and all the losses of the group. All the group 
members receive reciprocal advantages and disadvantages” (WP CCCTB 2007b, in  
footnote 30).  
 
  
25 
 
References 
 
Agúndez-Garcia, Ana (2006): The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated 
Tax Base for Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: a Review of Issues and 
Options, Working Paper, European Commission Taxation Papers. 
Anand, Bharat N. and Sansing, Richard (2000): The Weighting Game: Formula 
Apportionment as an Instrument of Public Policy, National Tax Journal, 53 (2), 183-200. 
CCCTB WG (2007a), CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Working Paper, 
CCCTB/WP060\doc\en. 
CCCTB WG (2007b), CCCTB: possible elements of a technical outline, Working Paper, 
CCCTB/WP057\doc\en. 
CCCTB WG (2007c), Report and overview of the main issues that emerged during the 
discussion on the sharing mechanism SG6 second meeting – 11 June 2007, Working 
Paper, CCCTB/WP056\doc\en. 
Fuest, Clemens, Hemmelgarn, Thomas and Ramb, Fred (2006): How would formula 
apportionment in the EU affect the distribution and the size of the corporate tax base? 
An analysis based on German multinationals, Working Paper, Deutsche Bundesbank 
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies. 
Gordon, Roger and Wilson, John D. (1986): An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate 
Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment, Econometrica, 54 (6), 1357-1373. 
Hellerstein, Walter, and McLure, Charles E. Jr (2004), The European Commission’s Report 
on Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of US 
States, International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 199-220. 
Kobetzky, Michael (2008): The Case for Unitary Taxation of International Enterprises, 
Bulletin for International Taxation, 5, 201-215. 
Kovács, László (2008): Opening Speech of the 62nd IFA Congress, Brussels, published in 
IFA Yearbook 2008, 34-38. 
Lang, Michael, Pistone, Pasquale, Schuch, Josef and Staringer, Claus (eds) (2008): 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, Linde: Wien.  
Martens-Weiner, Joann (2002): Formula Apportionment in the EU: a dream come true or the 
EU’s worst nightmare?, Working Paper, CESifo. 
Martens-Weiner, Joann (2005), Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the 
European Union: Insights From the United States and Canada, Working Paper, 
European Commission Taxation Papers. 
Martens-Weiner, Joann (2006): Company Tax Reform in the European Union, Springer: New 
York. 
McLure, Charles E. Jr (1980): The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing, 
in Aaron, Henry J./Boskin, Michael J. (Eds), The Economics of Taxation, Washington 
D.C., 327-336. 
McLure, Charles E. Jr (2002): Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm`s Length 
Principle with Formulary Apportionment, Bulletin for International Taxation, 586-599. 
Mintz, Jack (2004): Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It’s All About Compliance, 
International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 221-234. 
 
 
26 
 
Mintz, Jack (2007): Europe Slowly Lurches to a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: 
Issues at Stake, in Schön, Wolfgang, Schreiber, Ulrich and Spengel, Christoph (Eds), A 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Europe – Eine einheitliche 
Körperschaftsteuerbemessungsgrundlage für Europa, Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, 128-
138. 
Oestreicher (2000), Konzern-Gewinnabgrenzung, Beck: München  
Shackelford, Douglas and Slemrod, Joel (1998): The revenue consequences of using 
formula apportionment to calculate U.S. and foreign-source income: a firm-level analysis, 
International Tax and Public Finance, 5: 41-59. 
Wellisch, Dietmar (2004): Taxation under Formula Apportionment – Tax Competition, Tax 
Incidence, and the Choice of Apportionment Factors, FinanzArchiv, 60 (1): 24-41. 
Weninger, Patrick (2009): Formulary Apportionment in the EU, Intersertia: Mertsel.  
 
 
 List of SFB Discussion Papers: 
 
 Author Title
1 Carlos Reyes European Portability Rules for Social Security Benefits 
and their Effects on the National Social Security 
Systems 
2 Christian Bellak 
Markus Leibrecht 
Roman Römisch 
New evidence on the tax burden of MNC activities in 
Central- and East-European New Member States 
3 Minna Väre 
Christoph R. Weiss 
Kyösti Pietola 
On the Intention-Behaviour Discrepancy: Empirical 
Evidence from Succession on Farms in Finland 
4 Timo Fischer European Co-ordination of Long-term Care  Benefits: 
The individual Costs of Migration between Bismarck 
and Beveridge Systems 
Illustrative Case Studies 
5 Michael Lang Internationale Kapitaleinkommensbesteuerung nach 
dem Wohnsitzprinzip oder dem Quellenprinzip 
Eine kritische rechtswissenschaftliche Analyse des in 
den DBA enthaltenen Quellenprinzips 
6 Martin Zagler Distributional Consequences of Capital Tax 
Coordination 
7 Christian Bellak 
Markus Leibrecht 
Effective tax rates as a determinant of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Central- and East European Countries 
A Panel Analysis 
8 Lars Gläser EU-Zinsenbesteuerung 
Vermeidung der Doppelbesteuerung 
9 Dietmar Aigner 
Lars Gläser 
Die Zahlstelle im Anwendungsbereich des EU- 
Quellensteuergesetzes 
10 Sandra Diwisch 
Peter Voithofer 
Christoph R. Weiss 
The “Shadow of Succession” in Family Firms 
11 Christina Gruber Die internationale Besteuerung von Aktienanleihen aus 
österreichischer Sicht – laufende Besteuerung 
12 Thomas Rixen Internationale Kooperation im asymmetrischen 
Gefangenendilemma - Das OECD Projekt gegen 
schädlichen Steuerwettbewerb 
13 Sandra Diwisch 
Peter Voithofer 
The “Shadow of Succession” in Family Firms – A 
Non-Parametric Matching Approach 
 Christoph R. Weiss 
14 Angelika Jettmar Europäisches Sozialrecht 
15 Eva Eberhartinger 
Erich Pummerer 
Die steuerliche Vorteilhaftigkeit der Verwertung 
ausländischer Verluste in Österreich – ein 
Rechtsformvergleich 
16 Eva Eberhartinger 
Martin Six 
National Tax Policy, the Directives and Hybrid 
Finance 
17 Silvia Rocha-Akis Labour tax policies and strategic offshoring under 
unionised oligopoly 
18 Klaus Vondra Between Tax Competition and Harmonisation: A 
Survey on Tax Competition 
19 Nadine Wiedermann-Ondrej Hybrid Instruments and the Indirect Credit Method – 
Does it work? 
20 Nadine Wiedermann-Ondrej Tax Treatment of Revenue Based Payments 
21 Martin Six Hybrid Finance in the Double Tax Treaties 
22 Margret Klostermann Tax Consequences of Hybrid Finance in Thin 
Capitalization Situations 
23 Pirmin Fessler Home country effects of Offshoring - A Critical 
Survey on empirical literature 
24 Martin Zagler Capital Taxation and Economic Performance 
25 Pasquale Commedatore 
Ingrid Kubin 
Source versus Residence 
A comparison from a New Economic Geography 
perspective 
26 Katrin Rabitsch Eastern European Integration and Tax Competition 
27 Eva Eberhartinger 
Martin Six 
Taxation of Cross border Hybrid Finance – A legal 
Analysis 
28 Sandra Diwisch 
Christoph R.Weiss 
Motive und Konsequenzen einer Familiennachfolge: 
theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Ergebnisse 
für Österreich 
29 Aleksandra Riedl 
Silvia Rocha-Akis 
Testing the tax competition theory: 
How elastic are national tax bases in western Europe 
30 Michael Klien 
Markus Leibrecht 
Özlem Onaran 
Globalization, welfare regimes and social protection 
expenditures in Western and Eastern European 
countries 
 31 Martin Zagler The EU CCCTB Proposal: A Critical Appraisal 
32 Claudia Hochgatterer 
Markus Leibrecht 
Tax Competition as a cause of falling corporate income 
taxes: A literature survey 
33 Eva Eberhartinger 
Erich Pummerer 
Andreas Göritzer 
Cross-border Intra-group Hybrid Finance and 
International Taxation 
34 Lívia Antalová 
Contemporary Flat-Tax Reforms in Eastern Europe: 
Causes of Diverse Approaches 
A comparison of Slovakia, Czech Republic and 
Germany 
35 
Özlem Onaran 
Valerie Bösch 
Markus Leibrecht 
How does globalization affect the tax burden on labour 
income, capital income and consumption in different 
welfare regimes?  
The case of Western and Eastern EU Member States 
36 Anil Duman Flux or Fixed: Tax Reforms, Informal Economy and Foreign Investment in New EU Member States 
37 
Thomas Baldauf 
Erich Pummerer 
Alexandra Wittmann 
Zinsschranke und EBITDA-Vortrag 
- Wirkungsanalyse unter Unsicherheit 
38 Matthias Petutschnig 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: 
Effects of Formulary Apportionment on Corporate 
Group Entities 
 
